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McKinstry: State and Local Government

State and Local Government
by Daryl 1. McKinstry*
Introduction

During the year October 1, 1966 to October 1, 1967,
approximately 100 cases concerning various phases of state
and local government were decided by the appellate courts in
California. Some of the cases concerned themselves with
other fields of law as well, but only those aspects of the cases
that directly relate to government are discussed here.
F or the purpose of providing easy reference, the cases
decided for the period have been arranged under six major
headings, in outline form, according to the field covered. 1
* A.B. 1950, University of California;
LL.B. 1958, Golden Gate College,
School of Law.
County Counsel,
County of El Dorado. Member, California State Bar.
The author extends his appreciation
to David T. Loofbourrow, Jr., thirdyear Student at Golden Gate College,
School of Law, for assistance in the
preparation of this article.

1. Because of the volume of legislation affecting state and local government passed in the 1967 session, no
attempt has been made to comment
on this legislation. See Cont. Ed. Bar,
REVIEW OF SELECTED 1967 CODE PROVISIONS (1967).
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GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN GENERAL
A. Municipal Corporations
1. Incorporation

In Enyeart v. Board of Supervisors of Orange County;
plaintiff sought, by mandamus, to compel the county board
of supervisors to set aside an order terminating proceedings
to incorporate a new city. The question presented was
whether or not the holders of "oil and gas leases" qualify to
file protests to terminate the incorporation proceedings.
While the court held that oil and gas leases constitute "land"
within the contemplation of the incorporation statutes for
both petition and protest purposes, and protests by such
owners can properly be considered by the board of supervisors, the court determined that the protests were not timely
filed. Until the 1963 amendment to section 34311 of the
Government Code, there was no provision for filing supplemental protests after the first hearing. In 1963, the following
was added to that section:
If at the time set for the first hearing, there are insufficient written protests filed with the board to terminate
further proceedings, the meeting shall be recessed not
less than 14 days, and supplemental protests may be
filed within 10 days after the first hearing.
This amendment became effective 2 days after the first
hearing was held by the board in this case. The protests in
question were filed some 5 weeks after the first hearing and
were disallowed by the court for failure to comply with the
10-day limitation of the 1963 amendment.
2. Issuance of Bonds

In Omicini v. City of Eureka/ plaintiffs sought to have
declared invalid a municipal ordinance that provided for the
improvement of public parking facilities through the issuance
of bonds. Their complaint stated that the proceedings that
2. 66 Cal.2d 728, 58 Cal. Rptr. 733,
427 P.2d 509 (1967).
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led to the adoption of the ordinance were invalid, and that
the alleged need was not supported by the evidence. Defendants filed a general demurrer, and their motion for summary
judgment was granted. In affirming the summary judgment,
the appellate court stated that where a challenge is to be
made on the legality of an ordinance providing for the issuance of bonds for the acquisition and improvement of public
parking facilities, those contesting such an action must follow
the statutory procedure as found in section 35271 of the
Streets and Highways Code. Section 35271 requires the filing of written objections prior to the council hearing; because
plaintiffs had failed to comply with this section, the objections
were considered waived by virtue of the provisions of Government Code section 35275.
In City of Santa Monica v. Grubb,4 the petitioner adopted
an ordinance authorizing the issuance and sale of bonds to
finance the construction of a water treatment plant. The
ordinance, however, excluded the provision of the state Revenue Bond Law of 1941,5 which required an election to authori21e the issuance of revenue bonds. Respondent, as Clerk
of the City of Santa Monica, had been directed to publish
notice inviting sealed proposals for the purchase of the revenue
bonds. He refused to issue the notice as directed because of
the petitioners' failure to, among other things, comply with
the election provisions of the Revenue Bond Law of 1941.
The court stated that a chartered city has the power to
issue bonds subject only to the limitations imposed by its
charter or by the California Constitution. The fact that a
city, acting within the scope of its municipal affairs and pursuant to its home-rule power, adopted only a portion of the
provisions of the Revenue Bond Law of 1941 and did not
adopt the requirement for an election to authorize the issuance
of revenue bonds payable from a special fund, did not constitute a violation of the provisions of Article XI, Section 18
of the California Constitution.
4. 245 Cal. App.2d 718, 54 Ca1.
Rptr. 210 (1966).

S. Ca1. Gov't Code §§ 54300 e/ seq.
CAL LAW 1967
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3. Initiative and Referendum

In Bragg v. City of Auburn,6 the district court affirmed the
principle stated in Mervynne v. Acker7 that the power of
initiative is not available to residents of a city to repeal
parking meter ordinances. Without the initiative power,
which is the power of the voters to place a measure on the
ballot, the petitioners have no means to effect a change in
the ordinance; while there is the possibility of referendum,
this latter power is limited to the governing body. In Bragg,
the petitioners, sponsors of an initiative petition, contended
that the 1961 amendment to Vehicle Code section 22508,
enacted after the Mervynne decision, was intended to restore
"local" control to meter regulations, and thus limited the
Mervynne decision. The court in Mervynne had held that
regulation of public streets remained a matter of statewide
concern, not a "municipal affair," and the power of initiative
is not available to residents of a city to repeal parking meter
ordinances. The 1961 amendment added the words, "any
ordinance establishing a parking meter zone shall be subject
to local referendum in the same manner as if such ordinance
dealt with a matter of purely local concern." (Emphasis
added. ) The suggestion, summarily rejected by the court,
was that the addition of the language "purely local concern"
modifies Mervynne, thereby also allowing an initiative petition.
4. Elections

In Farley v. Healey,S the California Supreme Court considered section 179 in the charter of the City and County
of San Francisco, which provides:
[R]egistered voters shall have the power to propose by
petition, and to adopt or reject at the polls, any ordinance, act or other measure which is within the power
conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact, or

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/18

6. 253 Cal. App.2d 45, 61 Cal. Rptr.
284 (1967).
7. 189 Cal. App.2d 558, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 340 (1961).
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any legislative act which is within the power conferred
upon any other board, commission or officer to adopt,
or any amendment to the charter.
Any declaration of policy may be submitted to the
electors in the manner provided for the submission of
ordinances; and when approved by a majority of the
qualified electors voting on said declaration, it shall
thereupon be the duty of the board of supervisors to
enact an ordinance or ordinances to carry out such policies or principles into effect, subject to the referendum
provisions of this charter.
The petitioners sought to place an initiative measure on the
ballot urging a cease-fire and American withdrawal from
Vietnam. The proposed measure read as follows:
It is the policy of the people of the City and County of
San Francisco that there be an immediate ceasefire and
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam so that the
Vietnamese people can settle their own problems. 9

It was argued that the initiative could not be submitted to
the electorate because it did not concern municipal affairs
on which the board of supervisors could enact binding legislation. The Supreme Court, however, found that the section
of the charter quoted above was not so limited. The court
pointed out that as representatives of local communities,
boards of supervisors and city councils have traditionally made
declarations of policies on matters of concern to the community, whether or not they had power to effectuate such declarations by binding legislation. This being the case, the majority of the court held that the proposed measure, assuming
the sufficiency of signatures, should be placed on the ballot
for the municipal election. Burke, J. and McComb, J. dissented, pointing out that the obligation of the judiciary of
this country is to interpret and apply the supreme law or
sovereign will of the people, and that the court's failure to
uphold the respondents in their refusal to permit municipal
9. 67 Cal.2d at 327, 62 Cal. Rptr. at
28,431 P.2d at 652.
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elections to be used to legislate on issues exclusively federal
in nature, is an abdication of that responsibility.
5. Qualification of Bidders

A determination by a public agency that only one bidder
is qualified to carry out a redevelopment project is not subject
to review by the appellate court in the absence of an abuse
of discretion, fraud, collusion, or bad faith on the part of the
public agency. In Old Town Development Corp. v. The
Urban Renewal Agency,lO proposals were solicited by the
Urban Renewal Agency, an agency of the City of Monterey,
for the redevelopment of property embraced in the project
referred to as the Custom House Redevelopment Project. A
redevelopment plan had been adopted, an alternate plan proposed, and a panel of experts was selected to review the qualifications of the prospective bidders. The party selected as the
only qualified bidder was a party that failed to submit a proposal on the adopted redevelopment plan. Notwithstanding
this fact, however, the court pointed out that the other bidder
had no legal cause for complaint since the agency could have
rejected that bidder's bid even if qualified. Where the public
agency reserves the right to reject all or any proposals in whole
or in part, even if the agency errs in exercising its discretion,
other bidders have no legal cause for complaint, since all
bids could have been rejected.
B. Counties
1. Streets and Highways

In Tucker v. Watkins/ 1 the plaintiff refused the defendant
access to a county roadway that passed through plaintiff's
land and onto that of the defendant. The trial court granted
the plaintiff an injunction because the parties' predecessors
in interest had dealt with the roadway as if it were abandoned,
by exercising exclusive dominion over the parts of the roadway
that crossed their respective properties. The appellate court
10. 249 Cal. App.2d 313, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 426 (1967).
432
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reversed, stating that a county road, once properly established,
continues to exist until abandoned as prescribed by statute. 12
The fact that a portion of the road in question had not been
used by the public since 1938, and the fact that the county
had expended no funds for the improvement of the road, did
not constitute an abandonment.
Section 7901 of the California Public Utilities Code gives
telephone and telegraph corporations the right to construct
lines for telegraph or telephone along public roads or highways. The court, in County of Los Angeles v. General Telephone Company of California,13 interpreted the term "highway" in that section to include highways supported by bridges,
thereby authorizing the telephone company to use county
bridges without being liable to the county for any charge.
2. Secret Meeting Law

Only two cases were decided in which the "Secret Meeting
Law" (The Brown Act) 14 was considered. As this was legislation expressly inacted to insure that legislative action and
deliberation be conducted openly, the holdings were in no way
startling. In Letsch v. Northern San Diego County Hospital
District,15 the court stated that where an executive session concerning a personnel matter is held during a regular meeting of
a public agency, and the action taken at the close of the executive session was taken at the regular meeting open to the
public, there was no violation of the act. In Old Town Development Corp. v. The Urban Renewal Agency,16 the alleged
violation was summarily rejected for a failure to sufficiently
allege a violation of secrecy.
3. Public Records

In Bruce v. Gregory,17 a taxpayer sought to compel a county
tax collector to make certain tax records regularly available
12. See Cal. Streets & Highways
Code § 901.
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 903, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 805 (1967).
14. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 54950 et seq.
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265, 423 P.2d 193 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
433

7

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 18

State and Local Government

for inspection. The case required construction of section
1227 of the Government Code, which provides that public
records in the office of any officer are subject to public inspection by any citizen of the state at all times during office hours.
In addition, section 1892, Code of Civil Procedure, provides
that every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of
any public writing of this state. The court stated that a
statute should not be given literal meaning if it would result
in absurd consequences, since statutes are subject to implied
rules of reason. A denial of inspection is proper only when
necessary to prevent interference with a tax collector's office.
In this case, the tax collector had rules for inspection, which
were held to be reasonable. The records were available for
inspection from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. daily. (The office
was open from 8: 00 a.m. to 5: 00 p.m.) The records were
inspected in a special section of the office and access to the
records was restricted during July and August, preceding
and following the December 10 and April 10 delinquency
dates, and preceding tax sales. The court held that these
limitations were reasonable. Justice Mosk dissented on the
basis of statutory construction and pointed out that nothing
in the statute gave the tax collector the right to restrict public
inspection. The dissent, in effect, rejected the "implied rule
of reason."
4. Redistricting

In Wiltsie v. Board of Supervisors/ 8 the Supreme Court of
California once again considered the question whether the
percentage of population in each supervisorial district was
within allowable limits. The court cited Miller v. Board of
Supervisors/ 9 which relied in part on section 25001 of the
Government Code; the Code provides for a change of boundaries of supervisorial districts so that they will be as nearly
equal in population as possible. Section 25001 finds a presumption of validity in the districting of a county where no
district is more than 23 percent or less than 17 percent of
18. 65 Cal.2d 314, 54 Cal. Rptr.
320,419 P.2d 440 (1966).
434
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the overall population of the county (a population ratio of
1.35 to 1). In the instant case, the percentage of population
among the districts ranged from 9.8 percent to 33.9 percent,
a population ratio between the most and least populated districts of 3.46 to 1. Since the population distribution failed
to meet the standards of the Miller case, and there was no
sufficient factor existing to command any particular division
in the county, the Court required redistricting.
The appellate court, in Thompson v. Board of Directors,20
considered the question of whether a board of directors of
an irrigation district was compelled to change the boundaries
of the divisions within the district, where the percentage of
total popUlation for the divisions ranged from 7 percent to 35
percent. The question considered was whether the "one man,
one vote" doctrine of the federal apportionment cases applies
to an irrigation district. The court determined that the application of the doctrine to a special district depends on such
factors as the purpose of the district, the nature of its functions,
and the manner in which they are exercised. It stated that
if the principal purpose of the district is to provide a service
that can be provided by a private or quasi-public corporation
(for example, a public utility company), and if the district
does not exercise general powers of government, it is not
subject to the "one man, one vote" rule. The court concluded
that the irrigation district possessed none of the essential
characteristics that would require the application of the "one
man, one vote" doctrine. The court pointed out, however,
that section 21605 of the Water Code states that the board
of directors of an irrigation district may change boundaries
of the divisions when the board deems it advisable and in
the best interests of the district to do so. The court stated
that the word "may" in that section does not grant unlimited
discretion to act. 1 The court then compelled the redistricting
of the divisions within the district because of the abuse of
discretion shown by the board's drastic deviations in population ratios among the divisions.
20. 247 Cal. App.2d 587, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 689 (1967).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967
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EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
A. Discharge Cases

In Wisuri v. Newark School District of Alameda County,S
the court dealt with section 13583 of the Education Code,
which, prior to its repeal, required an employment contract
for classified employees, who are defined in section 13581 of
the Education Code as full-time noncertified employees. The
court stated that a permanent employee in the classified service
of a school district can be discharged only for cause and
after a hearing. The district distributed to each employee,
upon hiring, a handbook describing the rules and regulations
governing employment. The handbook did not contain those
provisions normally included in a contract of employment.
The court found that the district would be bound by the
common ordinary meaning of the word "permanent," and
required the plaintiff to be afforded a hearing. The court
stated that by construing the handbook as a contract, the
handbook described plaintiff's classified position as being permanent, and, therefore, he was subject to dismissal for cause
only. The court further stated that a notice of intent to
dismiss an employee in the classified service of a school district
is sufficient if it adequately informs the employee of the charges
against him so that he may prepare a defense and not be surprised at the hearings.
In another discharge case, Board of Trustees v. Hartman,S
the court stated that cohabitation with a married woman who
had left her husband, and later cohabitation with another
woman, is sufficient cause to dismiss a certified teacher for
immoral conduct and unfitness for service.
B. Transfer Cases

In American Federation of Teachers v. Oakland Unified
School District,4 a teacher was transferred from his teaching
2. 247 Cal. App.2d 239, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 490 (1966).
3. 246 Cal. App.2d 756, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 144 (1966).
436
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position in one high school to a similar position in another
high school. The transfer was set aside on the basis that
the school district failed to comply with the provisions of an
administrative bulletin adopted pursuant to the authority of
section 925 of the Education Code. The court stated that
the rules and regulations adopted by a board of education
are, in effect, a part of a teacher's employment contract and the
teacher is entitled to enforcement. s
C. Conduct of Public Employees: Political and Union Activities

In Ball v. City Council of the City of Coachella,6 the employment of a chief of police was terminated because of his
membership and participation in union activities. Since the
chief was appointed and held office at the pleasure of the
city council/ the court stated that he had no vested right
to retain his employment. The court continued, however,
that it does not follow that the power to terminate his services
is an unbridled one, free of all legal restraints. Where the
dismissal of a public employee indicates that it resulted from
the exercise by the employee of a constitutional right, the
courts are empowered to review the dismissal. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's finding that the action of the
city council in firing the police chief was arbitrary and illegal
in that it deprived the employee of his rights under Government Code sections 3500 et seq. The power to terminate a
public employee's services without cause and without notice
S. The tenure of a school teacher,
however does not bestow on the teacher
a vested right to teach at a specific
school or to teach a specific class level
of students. See Adelt v. Richmond
School District, 250 Cal. App.2d 149,
58 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1967). But where
a teacher was transferred from classroom teaching to home teaching for the
reason that the teacher wore a beard
and was not, therefore, setting a good
example for the students in school, the

transfer will be set aside. The court
stated in Finot v. Pasadena City Bd.
of Ed. 250 Cal. App.2d 189, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 520 (1967) that the teacher has
a constitutional right to wear a beard.
See Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in
this volume.
6. 252 Cal. App.2d 136, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 139 (1967).
7. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 36505-36506.
CAL LAW 1967
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or a hearing may not be exercised arbitrarily in disregard of
the employee's constitutiona18 or statutory rights. 9
D. Salaries and Wages
In Cosgrove v. County of Sacrament% the court considered a charter provision of the County of Sacramento, which
reads as follows:
In fixing compensation, the Board of Supervisors shall
at least annually, by ordinance, provide in each instance
for the payment of not less than the prevailing or general current rate of compensation or wages paid by
private employers in the County of Sacramento for similar quality or quantity of service, in case such prevailing
compensation or wages can be ascertained. Preference
in all cases shall be given to Sacramento County residents.
A salary ordinance was passed for the year 1963, to which
the petitioners took objection. The superior court issued
a writ of mandate directing the board of supervisors to reexamine available data and to procure new data, if necessary,
in order to determine prevailing salaries and wages in private
employment in Sacramento County. Later, the superior court
determined that the county had complied with the writ of
mandate. The appellate court stated that the board of supervisors, as the legislative branch of the government in the
county, is entitled to the exercise of discretion in judging
facts that constitute the basis of its resolutions and ordinances.
There is little, if any, leeway left to the appellate court to
control the action of the trial court where the trial court had
before it substantial evidence on which to act. The court
therefore affirmed the action of the trial court and determined
that the county had complied with the writ of mandate.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/18

8. Bagley v. Washington Township
Hospital District, 65 Cal.2d 499, 55
Cal. Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409 (1966).
For further discussion of this case, see
Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this
volume.
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The court in Sanders v. City of Los Angelesll had before it
a similar charter provision in the Charter of the City of Los
Angeles. A salary survey was made by the city administrative
officer and thereafter the council adopted an ordinance fixing
the salaries. The mayor vetoed the ordinance, and the council
failed to override the veto. No salary increases were provided
for that year. The appellate court found that the city ignored
the salary data evidence gathered, which established that in
many of the city jobs, salary increases were due. The court
pointed out that this was not only an abuse of discretion,
but also a flagrant breach of duty, and reversed the order discharging a writ of mandate.
EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Inverse Condemnation
Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo12 came to the appellate
court on the question of whether a cause of action had been
stated in the complaint against the defendant county. Plaintiff had purchased land that was zoned A-I, permitting a
density of one residential dwelling per acre. The plaintiff
submitted a tentative subdivision map requesting that the
County Planning Commission rezone the property to R-I,
a zoning under which the maximum allowable density of residential structures per acre would be increased from one to
five. The planning commission, however, after a review,
recommended a zoning of A-I-5, a classification requiring 5
acres per single-family dwelling. The board of supervisors
accepted the recommendation and rezoned the area to A-I-5.
The court stated that the complaint failed to allege that the
ordinance establishing the zoning was a property-taking device rather than a regulation of the use of land, and cited
Anderson v. City Council 13 to reaffirm the proposition that
landowners have no vested right in existing or anticipated
11. 252 Cal. App.2d 531, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 539 (1967).
12. 247 Cal. App.2d 600, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 710 (1967).

13. 229 Cal. App.2d 79, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 41 (1964).
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zoning ordinances. Unless the complaining party pleads facts
to show that an ordinance is unreasonable as a matter of law,
a court will neither presume the invalidity of a zoning ordinance nor consider the substitution of its judgment on the
issue of zoning for that of the public authority.
Also of interest is Smith v. County of San Diego,14 where
the court held that although an owner of land abutting a
highway is not entitled to access at all points along his boundary, destruction of a right of access by the construction of a
drainage ditch on a highway easement owned by a public
agency may give rise to damages for inverse condemnation.
B. Damages

In County of Santa Clara v. Curtner,15 the county condemned property for freeway purposes. The property owner
claimed and was awarded severance damages. The county
appealed the award of severance damages on the grounds that
it included damages that resulted from a plan adopted by the
City of Mountain View to relocate certain streets closed by
the county's construction of the freeway. The court stated
that the property owners were entitled to severance damages
resulting from the county condemnation proceedings to the
extent that the fair market value of the remainder of their
property was depreciated, but that any damages accruing to
the landowners by the action of the City of Mountain View
must be compensated for by the city and not the county.
The court in Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson 16 held that in arriving at a determination of the market
value of land subject to condemnation, it is improper to
consider the increase in the value of such land by reason of
the proposed improvements to be made by the party condemning the land. Sales of property used in forming an
expert's opinion of valuation, to be admissible, must be sales
of property similar to the property being condemned, but need

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/18

14. 252 Cal. App.2d 466, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 602 (1967).
15. 245 Cal. App.2d 730, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1966).
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not be identical. The factors that should be considered in
determining such similarity are a combination of time, association, character, size, suitability, usability, and improvements. Where there is conflicting evidence on the probability
of a zone change, it is proper to leave the issue of such probability to the jury to be considered in reaching the valuation of
the property.17
In People ex reZ. Department of Public Works v. VaUejos,18
appellants contended that by allowing the state to take one
of the streets bordering the appellant's property for a freeway
off-ramp, the county had abandoned that street, and that the
appellants, as owners of the adjacent property, were entitled
to the unencumbered fee out to the middle of the former street.
Appellants were awarded damages for their loss of access,
but not for the loss of their alleged unencumbered fee. The
court stated that where streets are closed at or near their
intersection with any freeway pursuant to sections 100.2 and
941.2 of the Streets and Highways Code, there is no "abandonment," and therefore there can be no reversion of the easement
to the owner of the underlying fee as would be the case under
sections 954 and 960.2 of the Streets and Highways Code.
This being the case, the owner of the fee was not entitled
to compensation for the taking where the fee was burdened
with an easement that the county had transferred to the
state and that had not been abandoned or extinguished. Due
to the burden of the easement, the underlying fee was of
nominal value only. Where evidence of value is remote,
speculative, or conjectural, it is inadmissible as evidence of
proof of fair market value of land. 19
17. See also People ex rei. Dept. Pub.
Works v. Arthofer, 245 Cal. App.2d
454,54 Cal. Rptr 878 (1966).
18. 251 Cal. App.2d 414, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 450 (1967).

19. See City of Santa Cruz v. Wood,
252 Cal. App.2d 52, 60 Cal. Rptr. 26
(1967).

CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

441

15

Cal Law Trends and
Developments,
Vol. 1967,
Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 18
State
and Local
Government

POLICE POWER
A. Ordinances Regulating Conduct
1. Drinking
The court, in People v. Butler,20 considered an ordinance
making it a misdemeanor to drink beer, wine, or other intoxicating beverages on any street, sidewalk, alley, highway, or
playground. The issue was whether the state had exclusively
preempted the field and therefore prohibited the city from
passing legislation concerned with the consumption of alcohol
in the streets. The court pointed out that state law proscribes
the drinking of liquor in a vehicle on a public highway,! drinking on public school grounds, 2 drinking on licensed or unlicensed premises, 3 and drinking by minors in anyon-sale
licensed premises. 4 The court stated that by the adoption
of such selective laws, the legislature did not intend to say
that it had covered all those areas wherein the consumption
of alcoholic beverages might create police problems. Unless
the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered
by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern, or the subject matter has
been partially covered by general law couched in such terms
as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will
not tolerate further or additional local action, or the subject
matter has been partially covered by general law and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefits of the municipality, then the municipality may
adopt regulatory legislation. The court held that the state had
not preempted the entire field of consumption of alcoholic
beverages and that the provisions of the municipal code were
not exclusively a matter of statewide concern, and it thereby
upheld the ordinance in question.
20. 252 Cal. App.2d Supp. 772, 59
Cal. Rptr. 924 (1967).
1. Cal. Vehicle Code § 23121.
2. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25606.
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2. "Topless" Entertainment
In Carolina Lanes, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,5 the appellate court was confronted with an ordinance that, in part,
prohibited striptease acts in bowling alleys and poolrooms.
The court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutional,
since the purpose of the ordinance was not the regulation of
sexual conduct, but an attempt to safeguard the peace, health,
safety, convenience, morals, and welfare of minors attracted
to plaintiff's bowling establishment.
Whether or not the presence of a topless waitress constituted
entertainment was considered in People v. Kukkanen. 6 The
ordinance required that a written permit be obtained before
any person could operate any public place where food or
beverages were sold or any form of live entertainment provided, and stated that any female attendant who was topless
was included in the term "live entertainment." The court
pointed out that the licensing of live entertainment is a field
that is not preempted by the state, and found that the presence
of a topless waitress was, in fact, "entertainment."
In People v. Hansen,7 the court considered a municipal
ordinance that prohibited topless waitresses because of an
alleged health problem that the ordinance was designed to
correct. s The court found that the ordinance was a regulation of sexual activity, and therefore was preempted by the
state.
In Robins v. County of Los Angeles,9 the trial court enjoined the defendant county from enforcing a county ordi5. 253 Cal. App.2d 930, 61 Cal. Rptr.
630 (1967).
6. 248 Cal. App.2d Supp. 899, 56
Cal. Rptr. 620 (1967).
7. 245 Cal. App.2d 689, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 311 (1966).
8. The prosecution's argument may
have had more validity than the court
accorded it. See footnote 3, People v.
Kukkanen, 248 Cal. App.2d Supp. at
905, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 624 (App. Dept.
Sup. Ct. 1967). See also Bellflower
Mun. Code § 5108, ord. #204.

9. 248 Cal. App.2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr.
853 (1966).
The Robins opinion was by Division
1 of the Court of Appeal for the
Second Appellate District; the Justices
disagreed with their brethern of Division 4, who had decided the Hansen
case. The Robins court doubted that
"criminal sexual activity associated
with the public display of the naked
human body has been preempted by
state law."
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nance requiring restaurants and bars employing topless waitresses to obtain an entertainment license. This order was
reversed by the appellate court on the basis that the action
of respondents seeking an injunction was premature. The
court pointed out that one who is required to take out a license will not be heard to complain, in advance of making
an application, that there is a danger of refusal. The court
stated further that entertainment licenses are a valid source
of revenue to finance the expenses of regulating problems
arising in the conduct of establishments offering entertainment.
3. Streets and Highways
Ratkovich v. City of San Brundo dealt with an ordinance
that regulated trucking on the city streets, by providing in
substance that, with the exception of certain streets marked
as truck routes, the use, operation, and maintenance on all
remaining city streets of any vehicle or truck of a gross weight
of 27,000 pounds or more is unlawful. Vehicles hauling
materials exceeding the maximum weight limits were permitted to file an application with the city clerk after the
payment of a filing fee. The permit, when issued, required
that 2 cents per ton be paid to the city for the privilege of
using the streets. The stated purpose of the fee was to establish a fund to be used for the repair of damages done to the
city streets by vehicles carrying excessive loads. The trial
court found that the city did not at any time make any repairs
to the street in question for any damages caused by the
plaintiff. The appellate court, however, upheld the ordinance
and pointed out that the plaintiff presented no evidence to
show that the city's regulations for waiving the weight limitations were unreasonable or arbitrary, or that heavy loads
could have no possible effect on the pavement, or that there
was no rational support for the 2-cents-per-ton charge. The
court further pointed out that in the exercise of its police
power, a legislative body is vested with a broad discretion to
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Rptr. 333 (1966).
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determine not only what the public interests require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
It was held that the inquiry of the court is limited to determining whether the object of the ordinance is one for which
the police power may properly be invoked, and if so, whether
the ordinance bears a reasonable and substantial relation to
the objects sought to be obtained.
PLANNING AND ZONING
A. Conditional Use Permits

The court upheld a conditional use permit that required a
landowner to grant to the city, without compensation, an easement for road purposes in Gong v. City of Fremont.ll The
court stated that it could announce no holding concerning
the validity of the conditions attached to the use permit,
because that issue had not yet been properly presented to the
trial court. The court, however, observed that the imposition
of conditions upon the granting of a use permit is at worst
equivalent to a denial of the permit, and the courts have no
authority to interfere with the denial of a variance or use
permit except on a clear and convincing showing of fraud,
illegality, or abuse of discretion. The court commented that
conditions requiring dedication of land for street purposes
had been repeatedly upheld in the absence of a showing of
fraud, illegality, or abuse of discretion.
B. Billboards

After discussing the history of planning and zoning laws,
the court, in County of Santa Barbara v. Purcell, Inc.,12 stated
that the legislature, by the adoption of the Outdoor Advertising Act,13 intended that local governments might still regulate billboards under zoning laws. The ordinance in question limited the size and character of signs and advertising
11. 250 Cal. App.2d 568, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 664 (1967).
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structures, and stated that nonconforming outdoor advertising signs or structures could remain on the property for 5
years from the date of the adoption of the ordinance. The
defendant contended that the ordinance was based upon
aesthetics, and that zoning laws may be used only to protect
economic interests, and not to "preserve the priceless beauty
of a countryside for all men.,,14 The court stated that it was
unnecessary to meet that argument, for in Santa Barbara
County, scenic environment is commercial, since people come
to the county because of its natural beauty. Therefore, the
maintenance of billboards may reasonably be believed to have
an adverse effect upon that economy.
C. Retroactive Zoning Regulations
In an action to determine the constitutionality of a retroactive zoning ordinance, the court in Melton v. City of San
Pablo 15 stated that if the necessity or propriety of a zoning
regulation is a question on which reasonable minds might
differ, the legislative determination will not be disturbed.
Where there are considerations of public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare that the legislative body may have
had in mind, and that would justify the regulations, it must
be assumed by the court that the legislative body had those
considerations in mind, and that those considerations justified
the regulation. The ordinance in question required all portable or temporary vending establishments to obtain a use
permit. The plaintiff operated a restaurant in a remodeled
bus located in a commercially zoned area. The court found
that the ordinance was aimed at preventing not only unsafe
or dangerous use of the property, but also an untidy appearance and a diminution of property values that might attend
the unregulated parking and use of old vehicles at commercial
establishments in commercially zoned areas. The court
pointed out that the principle of neighborhood aesthetics is
related to property values, and is a proper subject of zoning
where such aesthetics bear in a substantial way on the utiliza14. 251 Cal. App.2d at 173, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 348.
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tion of land. Insofar as the retrospective application of the
ordinance, the court pointed out that ex post facto clauses
of both the State and Federal Constitutions apply only to
criminal statutes punishing conduct committed prior to their
enactment. The court stated further that the state's inherent
sovereign power includes the right to interfere with vested
rights whenever reasonably necessary for the protection,
health, safety, morals, and the well-being of the people.
D. Variances

The Supreme Court stated, in Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo
Association v. Board of Permit Appeals/6 that the presumption that an agency's rulings rest on the necessary findings
and that such findings are supported by substantial evidence,
does not apply to agencies who must expressly state their
findings and must set forth the relevant supporting facts. The
court, in citing Cow Hollow Improvement Club v. Board of
Permit Appeals,17 stated that in a mandate proceeding to
review the granting of a variance, the variance order may be
sustained only if the board's findings suffice to establish compliance with all of the statutory criteria and are supported
by substantial evidence in the record. The court distinguished
Siller v. Board of Supervisors. 1s The Siller case stands for the
proposition that a zoning board's action in granting a variance
must be sustained in the absence of a clear and convincing
showing of arbitrariness or caprice. The court pointed out
that in Siller, the board was not required by its governing
provisions to specify its findings and ultimate conclusions.
In the instant case, however, the code provided for five conditions that had to be met in order to obtain the variance.
The zoning administrator found none of these conditions to
exist, and the court, upon review, found that only three of
the conditions existed. Since there was no specific finding
Gill all of the conditions, as required by the planning code,
16. 66 Cal.2d 767, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146,
427 P.2d 810 (1967).
17. 245 Cal. App.2d 160, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 610 (1966).

18. 58 Cal.2d 479, 25 Cal. Rptr. 73,
375 P.2d 41 (1962).
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the court granted a writ of mandate compelling the Board of
Permit Appeals to reverse its decision granting a variance.
E. Building Permits

In Russian Hill Improvement Association v. Board of Permit Appeals,19 the controversy involved an attempt by the
Board of Permit Appeals to authorize the construction of a
building that would rise to over twice the height permitted
by the governing ordinances of the City and County of San
Francisco. The court held that even though the permit had
been approved by the planning commission, it was not final
until the 10-day appeal period provided by statute had elapsed,
and, since the permit application was still pending before the
Board of Permit Appeals when the new height limitation became effective, the permit was not "granted" in time to confer
immunity under section 150 of the City of San Francisco
Planning Code. 20 The code states that any building for which
a permit has been lawfully "granted" prior to the effective
date of an amendment to the code may be completed and
used in accordance with approved plans, provided that the
construction is started and diligently prosecuted to completion, and it shall thereafter be deemed to be a lawfully existing building or use. The restrictive ordinance in question
became effective after the permit had been issued by the planning commission but before the appeal period had elapsed and
the permit became final.

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AGENCIES
A. Filing of Claims

1. Late Claims
In Viles v. State of California,! the plaintiff was erroneously
informed by an insurance adjuster that he had 1 year to bring
19. 66 Cal.2d 34, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672,
423 P.2d 824 (1967).
20. City of San Francisco Planning
Code § 150.
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an action for wrongful death, when the claim was subject
to a claim statute that required the claim to be presented not
later than 100 days after the accrual of the cause of action. 2
The court found that there was no prejudice to the public
agency since the accident had been fully investigated, and the
failure to file the claim within the 100-day period was excused.
Burke, J. dissented on the ground that the only asserted mistake was one of law, and stated that this decision would
open the door to evasion and eventual erosion of the claims
legislation for all practical purposes.
In Tammen v. County of San Diego,3 the cause of action
accrued on February 18, 1963. The 1963 Tort Claims Act/
with its 100-day statute of limitations, had become effective
September 20, 1963. By its own terms, the Tort Claims Act
applied to all causes of action "heretofore or hereafter accruing." In view of this provision of the act, the 100-day limitation commenced on September 20, 1963, and expired on
December 30, 1963. Plaintiffs presented a claim to the board
of supervisors on January 8, 1964, which was rejected, and
thereafter unsuccessfully applied to the county for leave to
present a late claim. Section 912 of the Government Code
provides, in part, that the superior court shall grant leave to
file a late claim, unless the public entity establishes that it
would be prejudiced if leave to present the claim were granted,
if the court finds that the application to the board to file a
late claim was made within a reasonable time, not to exceed
1 year after the accrual of the cause of action, and that the
failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect. The superior court denied the
petition, and found the application to the board had not been
made within a reasonable time and that the plaintiff's failure
to present her claim had not been excusable. The appellate
court, in affirming the lower court decision, pointed out that
the showing required under Government Code section 912
2. Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2.
In
1965, section 912 was repealed, and a
new procedure for obtaining judicial
relief is set forth in section 946.6 of
the Government Code.
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to establish mistake or inadvertence as a ground for a leave
to file a late claim against the county is the same as the showing
required under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure
for relieving a party from a default judgment. The court
went on to state that the controlling factor in obtaining relief
from a mistake of law is the reasonableness of the misconception of the law under the circumstances as viewed by the
trial court. The refusal to grant relief is within the trial
court's discretion, and the appellate court will not disturb
the lower court's finding, without a showing of abuse of that
discretion. 5
In another case dealing with an attorney's error, in which
a claim should have been filed on or before April 7, 1964,
but was actually filed on May 19, 1964, the court held that
a calendaring error in the attorney's office was excusable neglect within the provisions of section 912(b) (1). There was
no showing that the city would have been prejudiced by allowing the late claim to be filed. 6
2. Filing a Claim Required

In an action to recover damages for extra work and materials furnished in connection with the construction of a highway, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies against the State of California as a prerequisite to the filing and pursuing of a claim against the
county. The contention in Calabrese v. County of Monterey7
was that the cause of action did not accrue until the administrative remedies against the State Board of Control had been
exhausted. The fact that the plaintiff was, in part, misinformed by state officials could not be used by the plaintiff
as an excuse for failing to comply with the time requirements
for filing a verified claim for money damages against the
county. In this case, involving a federally aided secondary
development project, the state supervised the project and

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/18
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of San Francisco, 250 Cal. App.2d
767, 58 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1967).
6. Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles,
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awarded the construction contract, but was only a nominal
contracting party. The county was the real party in interest.
Extra compensation would have had to be paid out of county
funds; therefore a claim had to be filed with the county.
The claim, of course, must be filed with the proper governmental agency, and in a case where a claim was filed with
the city rather than the school board, the doctrine of "substantial compliance" was held to be not applicable. 8
In Miller v. Hoagland,9 a city attorney, representing a city
that had been a party to a lawsuit,lO was sued by the plaintiff
for money damages. In the prior action, the attorney had
written a letter to the judge, which was alleged in this action
to contain slanderous statements. The plaintiff failed to file
a claim against the city and a judgment sustaining a demurrer
to the complaint without leave to amend was affirmed. It
was alleged by the plaintiff in the later action that the attorney
had acted outside the scope of his employment in writing this
letter. The court found that the attorney had been acting
in his official capacity as the legal advisor to the city and
was therefore not subject to suit. Under the claim law,ll in
order to obtain relief the plaintiff would have had to file a
claim against the city, which he failed to do, and a judgment
sustaining the demurrer to the complaint without leave to
amend was affirmed.
B. Liability for Torts

The concept of civil immunity for a "discretionary act" by
a public official, provided for in section 820.2 of the Government Code, was considered in the case of Burgdorf v. Funder. 12
The plaintiff sued a state official for libel based upon a letter
containing alleged defamatory statements. The letter was
sent to the plaintiff by the tax collector, advising the plaintiff
that his claim was considered excessive and therefore the
8. See Jackson v. Board of Education, 250 Cal. App.2d 856, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 763 (1967).
9. 247 Cal. App.2d 57, 55 Cal. Rptr.
311 (1966).
10. City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 64

Cal.2d 93, 48 Cal. Rptr. 889, 410 P.2d
393 (1966).
11. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 950.2 and
911.2.
12. 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 805 (1966).
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

451

25

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 18

State and Local Government

state was refusing to make a tax refund. The court, in sustaining a judgment of dismissal, stated that it was reasonably
apparent from the pleadings that the defendant had exercised
his judgment in passing on the plaintiff's claim for a tax
refund, and that the defendant was protected when acting
within the scope of his authority, even if the defendant had
exercised poor judgment or abused his discretion. The court
pointed out that since there was an insufficient showing that
the official was acting outside the course and scope of his
employment, the plaintiff was required to file a claim for damages within the time limits prescribed by statute.
In Sanders v. County of Yuba,13 the plaintiff, an inmate in
defendant's county jail, received an eye injury as a result
of coming in contact with a towel rack attached to his bed.
The court was faced with the problem of reconciling sections
845.6 and 844.6 of the Government Code. Section 845.6
provides that the public entity will be liable if an employee
of the entity or the entity has reason to know that a prisoner
is in need of immediate medical care and thereafter fails to
take reasonable action to summon such medical care. Section
844.6 states, in part, that notwithstanding any other provisions of law, a public entity is not liable for an injury to
any prisoner. The court reasoned that section 844.6 intended
a public entity not to be liable for an impact type of injury.
In other words, the county would not be liable for the injury
that occurred to the plaintiff when he originally injured his
eye. However, under section 845.6, the defendant county
would be liable when an employee knows or has reason to
know of the need of immediate medical care and fails to
summon such care. Liability attached, therefore, not as a
result of the original injury, but for the failure to provide
medical attention.
The court also considered section 844.6 of the Government
Code in the case of Garcia v. State of California.14 In that
case, a prisoner had died of injuries received by the collapse
of certain equipment at a state prison. His surviving wife
13. 247 Cal. App.2d 748, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 852 (1967).
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and children brought an action for wrongful death. It was
the state's position that since the prisoner could have no cause
of action under section 844.6( a) (2), the heirs could have
no cause of action. The court relied on subsection (c), which
states:
Nothing in this section prevents a person, other than a
prisoner, from recovering from the public entity for an
injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public
property under Chapter 2 (commencing with § 830) of
this part . . . ,
and section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure/ 5 and held
that the heirs had the right to recover damages by reason of
the decedent's wrongful death, assuming proof establishing a
dangerous condition on public property.
In Gardner v. City oj San Jose,16 the plaintiff was injured
while crossing a heavily traveled, unmarked intersection. The
court concluded that a subway, constructed for the purpose
of providing a passage under the street, was unlighted and
in an unsanitary condition, thus constituting a dangerous condition that forced the plaintiff to cross the intersection at street
level. The dangerous condition of the subway and the lack
of crosswalks in the intersection created in effect a trap for
the pedestrian, and both driver and pedestrian could have
claimed a right-of-way according to the provisions of the
Vehicle Code. 17 Draper, J. dissented on the basis that the
subway was not a dangerous condition within the contemplation of sections 830 and 835 of the Government Code, as
there was no evidence that the plaintiff's election not to use
the subway was occasioned by the condition of the subway.
In Sava v. Fuller/ s the court stated that the rule in Muskopf
v. Corning Hospital District/9 that "when there is negligence,
the rule is liability, immunity is the exception," had been
15. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377 provides for suit for wrongful death by or
against heirs or personal representatives.
16. 248 Cal. App.2d 798, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 176 (1967).
17. Cal. Vehicle Code § 21953.
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reversed by the adoption of the Tort Claims Act of 1963.
Now immunity is the rule, and the exceptions are to be found
in the act. The court considered the meaning of "exercise
the discretion vested in him" as found in section 820.2, which
grants governmental immunity to public employees when they
are acting within the scope of their authority. In Sava, a
state botanist was alleged to have negligently analyzed a plant
substance, thereby causing the death of a child. The court
reversed a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, and stated that the botanist
had exercised his discretion when he agreed to analyze the
substance and thereafter liability would attach if he failed to
use ordinary care in making his analysis. The court cited
Morgan v. County of Yuba,20 a case where a sheriff had
repeatedly been told a man threatened to kill the deceased.
The sheriff failed to give the warning to the victim and the
man who had threatened him carried out his threat. The
court stated in that case that the sheriff could not claim discretionary immunity as a defense. Once he had promised to
act, he had already exercised his discretion and, by failing to
give the promised warning, he negligently omitted to perform
an act voluntarily assumed.
In Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco, an injury
occurred on a street maintained by the defendant city that
was undergoing maintenance work by an independent contractor who had agreed to post warning devices on the street.l
The court stated that where an activity involving possible
danger to the public is carried on under public authority,
the one engaging in the activity may not delegate to an independent contractor the duties or liability imposed on him by
public authority. Government Code section 830.8, declaring
public entities immune from liability for injuries caused by the
failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings,
or devices described in the Vehicle Code, is inapplicable when
a warning sign is necessary to warn of a concealed trap.
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In Hibbs v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District,2
the issue was whether the failure of the defendants to fence
a waterway that passed through a residential area containing
an elementary school amounted to the maintenance of a dangerous condition. The court stated that the defendant could
have reasonably anticipated that children would play in and
about the area, even though the storm drain was not conSince evidence that the actual
structed for that purpose. 3
use of the area as a play area was known to the defendant,
judgment for the defendant was reversed.
The claim of discretionary immunity as a defense under
section 820.2 of the Government Code was disallowed in
Scruggs v. Haynes/ where a police officer used unreasonable
force in making an arrest. The court stated that discretionary
immunity does not automatically operate to protect a police
officer from every error of judgment.
Section 830.6 of the Government Code was considered in
the case of Cabell v. State of California. 5 A student was
injured while attempting to open a glass door in a dormitory
building. He injured his hand when it slipped and went
through the glass in the door. The defendant relied on the
immunity granted by section 830.6. Plaintiff contended that
since the adoption of the plans and specifications that approved the construction of the doors, glass had been broken
and replaced with glass of the same specifications as required
under the original plans. Plaintiff contended that this constituted a maintenance of a dangerous condition by the defendant to which the plan or design immunity does not apply.
The court pointed out that as long as the maintenance was
in conformity with the original plans and specifications, the
reasonableness of the adoption or approval of plans must be
measured as of the time of such adoption, and the immunity
2. 252 Cal. App.2d 166,60 Cal. Rptr.
364 (1967).
3. See Cal. Gov't Code § 831.8,
which provides a public entity with immunity from liability for the conditions
of its reservoirs if the person injured
was not using the property for a pur-
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4. 252 Cal. App.2d 271, 60 Cal. Rptr.
355 (1967).
5. 67 Cal.2d 174, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476,
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of section 830.6 would apply. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Peters stated that the discretionary immunity of section
830.6 was intended to be an immunity similar to the immunity
granted by judicial decision in New York, which held that plan
and design immunity was not intended to apply to negligent
maintenance after the agency was on notice that the improvement created a dangerous condition. 6
In Becker v. Johnston,7 the plaintiff was injured in an intersection accident and claimed that the intersection constituted
a dangerous condition within the contemplation of section 835
of the Government Code. The court pointed out that although the plaintiff made out a case under section 835, section
830.6 provided for plan and design immunity to the county
in this case. Justice Peters dissented on the same basis as
he did in the Cabell case.
The Supreme Court, in Pfeifer v. County of San Joaquin,S
considered section 830 (a) of the Government Code, which
defines a "dangerous condition." Under the facts, the court
found that the plaintiff did not prove that the condition of
the crosswalk markings created an unreasonable risk of injury
to the pUblic. Because of this finding, it was unnecessary for
the Court to consider the plan and design immunity of section
830.6, urged by the county as a defense.
6. See Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579,
167 N.E.2d 63 (1960).
7. 67 Ca1.2d 187, 60 Cal. Rptr. 485,
430 P.2d 43 (1967).
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